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Simple, adaptively-prioritised, spatially-reusable medium access control through the
Dutch auction, with decentralised implementation for synchronised terminals
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Abstract-The Dutch auction (the price progressively of the offered object, and (iii) transaction "trans-
falls until a buyer "takes" the object) is proposed as parency" (fraud prevention)[1]. For medium-access con-
a foundation for decentralised medium-access control. trol (MAC), auctions provide a form of "prioritised
Common auction formats are well-understood, relatively access" in that the channel is allocated to the termi-
simple mechanism which have long been used for allo- nal that most values access. A terminal's valuation of
cating an indivisible good to the party that values it the nalethatomostevalues(access.eAeterminal'suvaluationro
os,for such reasons as speed of allocation, discovery access could either (a) represent the "true" monetarymost, "o a falcto,dsoey4;willingness to pay" of a (selfish) human user, or (b)
of the true "value" of the object, and fraud preven-
tion. Various auction schemes have been proposed for be a "priority" index computed/adjusted by software
the allocation of telecommunication resources, including inside the terminal using local information (e.g., [2],
medium access control (MAC). But previously proposals [6]). A terminal's priority may vary on such factors as
require a controller, and, to receive the bids, an alternate its "importance", packet type, location, channel state,
protocol which could waste resources, or miss important distance travelled, battery status, etc.
bids. For MAC, the Dutch auction has several major
virtues: (i) a bid-processing protocol that automatically
and simply prioritises the highest bid(s); (ii) possibility of Sealed-bid auctions for MAC
distributive (auctioneer-free) implementation for synchro-
nised terminals; (iii) confirmation of transmitter-receiver
pairs at auction time, with smooth continuation if the A MAC auction should be relatively simple and
pair is infeasible; (iv) exceptional signalling economy (the rapidly produce a winner, since access must be granted
only strictly necessary signal is the winning bid). Secure quickly, and repetitively. Thus [2], [6], [8] propose the
software inside each terminal may record transactions for equivalent of a "sealed bid" auction; i.e., each bid is
eventual payment collection, or the auction can be used as a independently submitted in a "sealed envelope", the
prioritised-access algorithm, without real money exchange. auctioneer "opens" all bids simultaneously, the highest
Below we evaluate qualitatively the MAC potential of bidder wins, and pays as pre-specified by the rules.
this auction, emphasising the distributed version, which A participant computes his bid considering his own
can control access with spatial reuse in a wireless adhoc valuation, what he may know (statistically) about the
environment.
valuations of other participants, and the specific rules of
EXTENDED ABSTRACT the auction.
General Motivation However, MAC sealed-bid actions do have disadvan-
Since time immemorial, auctions have been employed tages. They require an auctioneer (controller), as well
as a practical mechanism for the transfer of ownership of as an alternate MAC protocol to receive the bids. This
articles of value [1]. In the telecommunication domain, protocol may be problematic with a large, possibly
noteworthy relevant works include [2], [3], [4], [5], [6], variable number of bidders. If it is contention-free, it may
[71], [8], [9], [10]. be wasteful of resources; and if it is contention-based,
General reasons for choosing auctions include (i) the highest-value terminals maybe unable to make a bid,
speed of allocation, (ii) discovery of the true "value" and, consequently, a suboptimal allocation may result.
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The Dutch auction for MAC messages in DCF[II1]. If the transmitter-receiver pairing
In a Dutch auction, a public "clock" displays a pro- is not successful, the auction continues. Evidently, for
gressively falling price. Each participant watches and each price value, the "tick" of the auction "clock" must
waits until the price reaches a desired level. At some allow sufficient time for the possible exchange of these
point, the participant that most values the object indicates 3 messages before moving on to the next lower price.
its willingness to pay the current price [1]. The example below explains the process further.
For MAC purposes, the Dutch auction retains the Specific example: Figure 1 shows a situation in which
relative simplicity and allocation speed of sealed-bid 7 terminals wish access to a single communication chan-
auctions, and add several fundamental advantages: (i) A nel. A row in table I shows the index of a transmitter, its
built-in bid-processing protocol that automatically and desired receiver, and valuation. Conceivably, a terminal
simply prioritise the highest bid(s); (ii) the possibility could have a buffer with several possible messages each
of a distributive (auctioneer-free) implementation (start with its own valuation (see rows 2 and 3).
times, initial price, and rate of decrease can all be pre-
specified, so that a terminal can determine from its own
clock the current status of the auction); (iii) Confirmation
of transmitter-receiver pairs at auction time, with smooth i A
continuation if the pair is infeasible; (iv) exceptional
signalling economy (only one bid signal (the winner's) T3 r1 T2 r2r3Tl T4r T5 r5 T7 r6 T6 r7
is strictly necessary in a single channel scenario).
Evidently, the distributed implementation requires Figure 1. The distributed Dutch auction as a MAC protocol with
tight synchronisation among terminals, i.e., a "common spatial reuse
clock" (as would any "time slotted" or "spread spectrum"
MAC scheme). However, unsynchronised terminals can
be accommodated with the presence of an auctioneer, Table I
which can announce the beginning of the auction and
POTENTIAL TRANSMITTERS, RECEIVERS AND VALUATIONS
its (possibly adaptable) initial price and time-rate of de- Ti r v
crease. In fact, the auctioneer could broadcast the falling I I 1l
price, if the participating terminals lack an accurate 1 4 9
clock. 2 2 7
Despite the above, [3] seems to be the only previous 3 1
application of the Dutch auction in a telecommunication 4 3 5
context (bandwidth allocation, not MAC). 5 4
6 7 3
Dutch auction with spatial reuse 7 6 2
Core protocol: For synchronised terminals, the dis-
tributed Dutch auction can provide medium access, with At to, each terminal (regardless of the physical loca-
spatial reuse. At tothe first auction starts with the pre- tion) knows that the (distributed) Dutch auction starts,
specified initial price, and time-rate of decrease, and lasts at a pre-specified price, say 11, which will fall at a rate
t. At time to + t the first winner(s) access the medium of 0.1 every e. E < t is long enough to allow the 3
for a length of time T (even if a winner is selected messages mentioned above. After a length of time of
in less than t, channel access starts at to+t). At time 9F the price is 10.1, which is too high for everyone.
to +t+ T another auction of length t starts, with pre- After one more F, the price becomes 10. Terminal 1
specified parameters, followed by a period of channel immediately sends its "I take it" message but r1 is out of
usage of length T, and so on. range, and does not respond. Thus, the clock continues
When a terminal wishes to "take it", up to 3 short to"tick" without a winner. 10F later, the price drops to
messages may be sent: (1) the winner sends its ID and 9, and T1 sends another "I take it" message this time
that of the desired receiver (2) the receiver, if available, with intended partner r4. r4 is in range, but in sleeping
sends a short confirmation message (3) the winner sends mode (indicated by a dotted red outline in fig. 1 ). Again,
a 2nd short message confirming the successful pairing, the pairing fails, and the clocks continues to tick (T1
These 3 messages are reminiscent of the RTSICTS has no additional potential partners, and "drops out"
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of this auction). Eventually the price reaches 7, which Conclusion
triggers an "I take it" from T2 (heard by T1, rl, r2 Previous work has shown the feasibility and effec-
and r3); r2 confirms (heard by Tl, T2, T4 and r3), and tiveness of auctions for simple, adaptively-prioritised
T2 confirms the successful pairing (heard by T1, rl, medium-access allocation. But previous proposals re-
r2 and r3). Notice that T3 has not heard any of the quire an auctioneer (controller), and an alternate MAC
previous messages, and continues to behave as if there protocol to handle bids, which could either waste re-
has been no winners. Thus, 10_ later, T3 'thinks' that sources, or miss important bids. We have analysed
the price is 6, and sends its "I take it" (heard only by qualitatively the potential of the Dutch auction for
rl). But r1declines, because it knows about the T2 -* r2 medium access allocation, and conclude that it retains
pairing (notice that r1 would not have known this without the favourable features of previously proposals, while
the second message from T2). The process continues remedying their most serious limitations, and expanding
similarly with T5 and T6 setting successful pairings, but the set of scenarios where MAC auctions can be used.
not T7. Notice that, similar to T3 before, T7 has not
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